The euro zone crisis illustrates the insufficiency of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union characterized by a large heterogeneity. Exchange rate adjustments being impossible, they are very few alternative mechanisms. This situation reflects a simple diagnosis. At the level of the whole euro zone, the euro is close to its equilibrium parity. But the euro is strongly overvalued for Southern European countries, France included, and largely undervalued for Northern European countries, especially Germany. In a first step, the paper gives an evaluation of these exchange rate misalignments inside the euro zone, using a FEER approach. Using panel econometric techniques over the period 1994-2011, we confirm that the exchange rate misalignments in the euro zone have diverged, reflecting unsustainable evolutions. Last, we give an estimation of the equivalent transfers in % of GDP implied by these misalignments in the different European countries. In a second step, we use a 'stock-flow consistent' model of a monetary union with two countries along the lines of Godley and Lavoie (2007) and Duwicquet and Mazier (2010) . A federal budget is introduced with federal expenditures and social transfers financed by federal taxes and euro-bonds issuing. Three results are obtained. The stabilizing role of such a federal budget is confirmed facing asymmetric shock or the negative impact of exchange rate misalignments inside the monetary union. Without such a federal mechanism the overvaluation of the Southern currency (Greek or Spanish euro), facing the undervaluation of the Northern currency (German euro), induces a strong slowdown in the South and a cumulative imbalances within the monetary union. Similarly, the stabilizing role of euro-bonds used to finance European investment projects is illustrated. Their role in the pooling of national debts would be the last point to examine. JEL Classification: F31, F32, F41, F37, E12.
Introduction
The euro zone crisis illustrates the insufficiency of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union characterized by a large heterogeneity. Adjustments mechanisms are defined in a broad sense as mechanisms which permit a country after a shock to return to the initial situation or, possibly, to recover towards full employment after a slowdown. Exchange rate adjustments being impossible, they are very few alternative mechanisms. Fiscal policy could play an active role and in a federal state like the USA its stabilization coefficient is around 20% (Italianer and Pisani-Ferry, 1992) . But there is no equivalent in the European case. Well integrated capital markets, with portfolio diversification and intra-zone credit, have been proposed as a powerful adjustment mechanism by the 'international risk sharing' approach. Intra-zone credit and capital income from international portfolio would have stabilization coefficients around 20-30% each (Asdrubali and Kim, 2004) . These results have been used during the 2000 by advocates of a liberal economic policy in the EU to promote deeper financial integration without having to develop a federal budget (Commission européenne, 2007; Trichet, 2007) . However, the theoretical basis and the results appear highly questionable (Clévenot and Duwicquet, 2011) . Consequently, relative wage and price flexibility are proposed in order to take place, at least partially, of exchange rate adjustments. Actually these mechanisms allow only a very slow and partial return to equilibrium with an important cost in terms of growth and employment and with large differences between countries, due to strong structural specificities. They are more inefficient when they are implemented simultaneously in interdependent countries, as it is presently the case in the euro zone, especially in the Southern European countries (Mazier and Saglio, 2008) . This situation reflects a simple diagnosis. At the level of the whole euro zone current account is close to equilibrium and fiscal deficit is smaller than in many other OECD countries. The euro is close to its equilibrium parity. But intra-European imbalances are huge. The euro is strongly overvalued for Southern European countries, France included, and largely undervalued for Northern European countries, especially Germany (Jeong et al., 2010) . These exchange rate misalignments block growth and induce fiscal and current deficits in the South while growth is boosted in the North by exports, especially towards the rest of the euro zone, and deficit are reduced. This situation is equivalent to implicit positive transfers in favour on the North and negative transfers at the detriment of the South, which are largely ignored in the public debate. The paper is organised as follow. In a first step, we give a new evaluation of these exchange rate misalignments inside the euro zone, using a FEER approach, and compare it with other estimations. Using panel econometric techniques over the period 1994-2010, we confirm that the exchange rate misalignments in the euro zone have diverged, reflecting unsustainable evolutions. Last, we give an estimation of the equivalent transfers in % of GDP implied by these misalignments in the different European countries. We compare these results with the evaluation of the system of fiscal insurance proposed by the Commission to fight asymmetric evolutions (Italianer and Pisani-Ferry, 1992) . In a second step, we use a 'stock-flow consistent' model of a monetary union with two countries along the lines of Godley and Lavoie (2007) and Duwicquet and Mazier (2010) . The model describes the real sector and assets and liabilities of all the agents in order to analyze financial integration in a consistent manner. A federal budget is introduced with federal expenditures and social transfers financed by federal taxes and euro-bonds issuing. Three results are obtained. The stabilizing role of such a federal budget is confirmed facing asymmetric shock or exchange rate misalignments inside the monetary union. Similarly, the stabilizing role of euro-bonds used to finance European investment projects is illustrated. Their role in the pooling of national debts would be the last point to examine.
2 Intra-European exchange rates misalignments and implicit transfers 2.1 Heterogeneity of misalignments within the euro area
Since the beginning of the 2000's, we observe a surge of current account imbalances inside the euro area in spite of a rather balanced current account for the whole area. On the one side, Northern European countries have accumulated huge current account surpluses and on the other side, Southern European countries have ran important current account deficit (see figure  1 ). These evolutions reflect, at least partially, increasing heterogeneity of exchange rate misalignments (ERM, hereafter) inside the euro area. By using a FEER approach, introduced by Williamson (1994) , Jeong et al. (2010) show that Northern countries are increasingly undervalued and Southern countries are increasingly overvalued. In this section, we estimate FEERs for ten European countries (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Greece) over the period 1994-2011. The FEER is defined as the exchange rate prevailing when the economy simultaneously reaches the external equilibrium and the internal equilibrium for all the trading partners. This measure was derived from a standard world trade model in which all the variables are endogenous ex-cept the external equilibrium (sustainable current account determined by structural variables) and the internal equilibrium (full utilization of the productive potential). The external equilibrium is estimated with panel regression techniques. The internal equilibrium is reached when the output gap is closed 1 . Since the early 2000's, we assist to a sharp increase of heterogeneity of misalignments in the euro area (table 1 and figure 1) . We can observe a split in the euro area between some countries increasingly undervalued (like Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland) and others increasingly overvalued (like Greece, Portugal, Spain and France). On average since 2005, Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland have been undervalued by 13% while Greece, Portugal, Spain and France have been overvalued by 23%. This structural heterogeneity is at the heart of current problems of the Euro. Since 2008, we observe a reduction of misalignments for some Southern European countries (Portugal, Ireland and, up to a certain point, Greece). These movements have been mainly driven by large real effective devaluations in Ireland, Spain and Greece, as shown by the evolutions of the unit labor cost (ULC) based real effective exchange rates in figure 2. These politics of internal devaluation are very painful and had led to an acceleration of the crisis in Greece. This important point will be discussed in the third part of this section. 125   130   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 Cline and Williamson (2011) . These authors use a FEER approach based on the Symmetric Matrix Inversion Method (SMIM) methodology described in Cline (2008) . The main differences with our own FEER approach are, in the one hand, a simpler treatment of foreign trade and, in the other hand, ad hoc current account targets. More prosaically, in the case of the euro area countries of table 2, Cline and Williamson calculate the needed change in the real effective exchange rate to reach a current account target in 2011 which stabilizes the Net International Investment Position of 2011. They, also, calculate the needed change in the real effective exchange rate to reach a current account target of 3% of GDP in absolute value in 2011. This standard assumption of imbalances of 3 percent of GDP in absolute value was adopted in their precedent works. On the whole, the results are largely similar Greece and Portugal exhibit large overvaluations. Germany is more undervalued in our results mainly due to population aging. In our approach, we estimate the equilibrium current account thanks to panel econometric techniques with some explanatory variables like the dependency ratios. A larger part of dependent population reduces the national saving rate and so the equilibrium current account. Secondly, we compare our own results obtained thanks to the FEER approach with misalignments obtained by a BEER (Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate) approach (Coudert et al., (Cline and Williamson, 2011) .
The current account targets follow the standard assumption of imbalances of 3 percent of GDP in absolute value.
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). This approach, introduced by Clark and MacDonald (1998) , consist to assess the impact of long run determinants on the dynamics of the real exchange rate thanks to econometric techniques. Many authors have selected parsimonious specifications with variables like the net foreign assets and the relative productivity. An accumulation of foreign assets induces an appreciation of the exchange rate and an increase of the productivity in the tradable sector relatively to the non-tradable implies an appreciation of the exchange rate (this variable captures the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect). After the estimation of a cointegration relationship, the misalignments are given by the gap between the real effective exchange rate and the equilibrium exchange rate (i.e. the product of the cointegration vector and the observed values of the explanatory variables). In this approach, it is supposed that the real effective exchange rate was at equilibrium on average over the period. (Coudert et al., 2012) As the BEER misalignments are, mainly, deviation from the average value of the real effective exchange rates on the studied period, countries with higher inflations rates, in a monetary union, will experienced higher real effective appreciation. If this appreciation has not stemmed from improvement in the net foreign assets or relative productivity, these countries will be increasingly overvalued. On the contrary, the FEER misalignments are, mainly, deviation from the average value of the current account on the studied period. In a monetary union, a widening of the current account deficit will produce an increasing overvaluation. In the BEER approach, France and Germany are close to equilibrium thanks to lower inflation rates than in peripheral countries. In the FEER approach, France is increasingly overvalued since the middle of the last decade (from 7 percent in 2005 to 13 percent in 2011) because of persistent current account deficits. On the contrary, Germany is increasingly undervalued (from 8 percent in 2003 to 23 percent in 2011) because of large current account surpluses even during the crisis (around 6 percent of GDP since 2008). In our view, this divergence between FEER and BEER approaches in the case of France and Germany reflects the fact that the FEER take into account structural evolutions which are ignored with the BEER. Especially the decline of the French structural competitiveness contrasts with the German improving performances, as it is illustrated by the evolution of observed and equilibrium current accounts. The BEER approach seems to be unsuited to describe structural problems of current account imbalances in the euro area because of its temporal horizon (López-Villavicencio et al., 2012) . For peripheral countries, the results are more convergent. They indicate double-digits overvaluations during the 2000's. For Spain (overvalued by around 10 %), Portugal (overvalued by around 15 %) and Greece (overvalued by around 20 %), the two measures of equilibrium exchange rate are close because of current deficits which move away from their average values and in reason of a strong real effective appreciation which deviates the real effective exchange rates from their average value.
Divergence of ERM inside the euro area
In other approaches of equilibrium exchange rate like the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate approach (BEER), the misalignments are necessarily stationary on the studied period. In this approach, the misalignments are residuals from long run relationship between the real effective exchange rates and its determinants thus the misalignment is stationary, by definition. In the case of European countries during the period 1994-2010, the hypothesis of exchange rates on average in equilibrium on the studied period (i.e. the misalignment is stationary) seems to be unrealistic since these countries have experienced diverging path concerning their competitiveness as evidenced by the evolution of current account imbalances (figure 1). In the long run and at the world level, the FEERs and the REERs are integrated and cointegrated. In other words, the misalignments are stationary for a large panel of industrialized and emerging countries on the period 1982-2007 to ensure external debt sustainability (Saadaoui, 2011) . Nevertheless for European countries on the period 1994-2010, it seems improbable that the misalignments have been stationary. In a first step, we implement various panel unit root tests on the series of natural logarithms of REERs 2 and on the series of natural logarithms of FEERs. This step allows to determine if the REERs and FEERs are non-stationary I(1) series. A series is I(1) if it achieves stationarity after first differencing. As in previous empirical studies (Zhou, 1993; Barisone et al., 2006; Saadaoui, 2011) , we detect the presence of unit roots in the series of real effective exchange rates (REERs) and in the series of fundamental equilibrium exchange rates (FEERs).
As we can see, in table 4, the series of REERs and FEERs are non-stationary in level since we accept the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root in all tests (except in the LLC test at the 5 percent level for the feer series). Besides, the series of REERs and FEERs are stationary in first difference since we reject the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root in all tests. In order to test if there is a long run relationship between REERs and FEERs inside the euro area, we can proceed in two distinct ways:
1. We can test the presence of unit root in the series of misalignments (i.e. the difference between the REERs and the FEERs). However, in this case, we made the implicit assumption that the series are cointegrated with (1; -1) coefficient.
Another way consists to test if there is a long run relationship between REERs and
FEERs by using panel cointegration tests (Pedroni, 1999) . In this case, we made any assumption on the value of the cointegrating vector.
If the misalignments are non-stationary or if we failed to detect a long run relationship between REERs and FEERs, we can conclude that the ERM have diverged during the period 1994-2010.
As you can see in table 6, we accept the null hypothesis of presence of unit root in all tests (except in the LLC test at the 5 percent level). As it is mentioned above, we check the robustness of the results (to the hypothesis of cross section independence) by implementing the CADF test (Pesaran, 2007) . We can conclude that the series of misalignments are non-stationary (see table  7 ). The previous results indicate that ERM have diverged inside the euro area during the period 1994-2010. However, the previous tests made a strong assumption on the value of the cointegrating vector. In order to test the divergence without assumption on the value of the cointegrating vector, we implement Pedroni's panel cointegration tests (1999).
In table 8, we accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration in most of test (except for the panel ADF and the group ADF statistics at the 5 percent level). The results indicate, clearly, a divergence on the studied period for these European countries. To ensure of the quality of the results, we implement cointegration test which allows for cross section dependencies introduced by Westerlund (2007) . The existence of a negative and significant error correction term is taken as proof for cointegration. In case of cross section dependencies between members of the panel, critical values need to be obtained through bootstrapping.
The panel and group mean statistics suggested by Westerlund (2007) indicate clearly that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted even in presence of cross section dependencies (see table 9 ). Panel unit root tests and panel cointegration tests show that ERM inside the euro area have diverged during the 1994-2010 period. We failed to detect a long run relationship between REERs and FEERs (i.e. the misalignment is non-stationary). This result indicates that European countries have experienced unsustainable evolution of their competitiveness during the period. This raises the question of necessary adjustments to restore competitiveness of overvalued countries. The balance of payment identity indicates that the current account is equal to the opposite of the capital account. Countries which run a current account deficit have to borrow to the rest of the world thus a current account deficit correspond to a capital account surplus. If a country run large current account deficit on an extended period of time, the question of the sustainability of its net external debt can be raised. Even if the current euro area crisis was triggered by concerns on high levels of public debt, the question of the sustainability of net external debts is a crucial issue since the deficit countries will have to run surpluses in the future in order to pay their current stock of external debt in order to avoid Ponzi strategies. All measures of European policy makers are focused on the competitiveness of (overvalued) countries which have problems to refinance their debts. The aim is to restore competitiveness in order to allow these countries to run current account surpluses (or at least, reduced current account deficit) to reduce the net external debt to GDP ratio.
As argued by Belke and Dreger (2011) , a reduction of unit labor cost (ULC) is on the top of the agenda for overvalued countries. However, they propose (as a reduction of competitiveness for surplus countries is not a feasible strategy) an asymmetric response through reduction of unit labor cost only for Southern European countries in order to reduce imbalances inside the euro area. Such an asymmetric proposal raises two kinds of questions. Firstly, are the overvalued countries able to restore their competitiveness only through reduction of ULC and such measures can (alone) really achieve a reduction of current account imbalances inside the euro area? Secondly, this kind of asymmetric proposal is a threat for economic growth of overvalued countries so we can wonder if the total effect on the external debt to GDP ratio is positive since slower growth tends to raise the external debt to GDP ratio. As pointed out by Felipe and Kumar (2011) , even a reduction of 20%-30% in nominal wage for Southern European firms would not restore competitiveness relatively to German firms, since the export basket is completely different and they would not be able to struggle with Chinese's wages in the export markets.
Since last ten years, the asymmetric evolution of misalignments in the euro area have reflected diverging path in terms of competitiveness. These evolutions are one of the main underlying causes of the current euro area crisis. In order to deal with these asymmetric evolutions, a federal budget could help overvalued countries to switch to new activities and improve their international specialization (Jeong et al., 2010; Duwicquet and Mazier, 2010) . In absence of coordination of national economic policies inside the euro area, the current euro area crisis leads to pressures of financial markets on countries with deteriorated competitiveness and weak perspectives of growth. These pressures push these countries to accept austerity plan to restore foreign investor confidence. A better macroeconomic management of the asymmetric evolutions of competitiveness could be a more efficient way to restore confidence and reduce imbalances inside the euro area.
Implicit transfers: Northern euro area versus Southern euro area
Exchange rate misalignments are meaningful at the intra-European level if we recognize the existence of an equilibrium current account related to structural specificities of each member of the Euro Area. This kind of concept has been considered in discussions on the extended stability pact which includes other criteria than the public deficit and debt. Such hypothesis implies that an exchange rate misalignment generates a gain or a loss in terms of cost competitiveness. In a monetary union, an equivalent transfer associated to the exchange rate misalignment can be computed. Two cases will be considered, the first one with only a bilateral exchange rate, the second with a two countries euro zone facing the rest of the world. Empirical evaluation will be given after.
The bilateral case
Such hypothesis implies that an ERM generates a gain or a loss in terms of price competitiveness. In monetary union, a transfer equivalent to the ERM can be computed. The ERM is expressed in deviation from equilibrium, we have:
with E, observed bilateral exchange rate 3 , E e , equilibrium bilateral nominal exchange rate, e, bilateral misalignment, p, domestic prices, p * , foreign prices.
As we can see in equation 1, in case of overvaluation (e < 0), we observe a lower price competitiveness and in case of undervaluation (e > 0), we observe a higher price competitiveness. The equivalent transfer T , associated to the ERM and which is, in fact, an additional unit cost, positive or negative, can be obtained by equalizing the actual level of competitiveness and the equilibrium level of competitiveness, corrected by the unit transfer T . We obtain:
In case of overvaluation (e < 0), we have a negative unit transfer which corresponds to an additional positive unit cost, the country transfer a part of its national income to the other countries.
In case of undervaluation (e > 0), we have a positive unit transfer which correspond to an additional negative unit cost, this reduction of unit cost will enhance the external trade of the country.
In case of overvaluation (e < 0), we have a positive unit transfer which corresponds to an additional positive unit cost. The country suffers of a loss of competitiveness. In case of undervaluation (e > 0), we have a negative unit transfer which corresponds to a reduction of the unit cost. This reduction improves the competitiveness of the country. In level, ex ante, in a case of overvaluation, the transfers represent an additional cost for exports (T .pX) and, in a symmetric way, an additional cost for local producers in competition with imported products (T .pmM). For the overvalued country, the total transfer in percent of GDP is equal to
T .(pX+pmM) pY
. In practice, an important share of imports corresponds to products which are not in competition with domestic products (raw materials, goods not locally produced). This share depends of the characteristics of the international specialization of each country. For simplicity, we will suppose in the evaluation of these implicit transfers that only half of the imports is in competition with domestic products. This will give a total transfer in percent of GDP equal to
. It is worthwhile to notice that the total transfer is positive function of the openness ratio. For the same misalignment, very open countries like Ireland will suffer of higher negative transfer in case of overvaluation than less open countries like Greece or Portugal.
The case of a two countries Eurozone
We consider now a euro zone with two countries North (N ) and South (S) and the rest of the world (the USA to simplify).
1$ = Ee
The euro zone is supposed to be at its equilibrium parity, which is close to the observed facts (E = E e ). On the opposite the two countries N and S are not at the equilibrium parity, the country S euro is overvalued, the country N euro undervalued.
eS (equilibrium exchange rate between €N and €S)
The overvaluation of the South is reflected in a real effective exchange rate inferior to its equilibrium value, which means a reduced competitiveness.
(with, to simplify, αSU S =
XS→U S XS
et αSN = XS→N XS ) For the estimation of the equivalent transfer associated to an overvalued South euro, we must evaluate, as previously, the additional unit cost T S which is necessary to pass from the level of competitiveness associated to the equilibrium exchange rate
to the observed and less favorable level
. It gives:
With e N > 0 as the North euro is undervalued in relation with the dollar, e S < 0 as the South euro is overvalued. T S is positive and corresponds to an additional unit cost associated to the overvaluation of the South euro (1/1 + e S ), but also to the undervaluation of the North euro in relation to the dollar (1 + e N ) αSN . As previously, the equivalent transfer associated to an overvalued South euro can be computed in % of GDP with:
• a transfer from the South to the North equal to Symmetrically the equivalent transfer associated to an undervalued North euro can be computed in the same way. The undervaluation of the North euro gives:
With e S < 0 et e N > 0, T N is negative and represents a subvention received by the North, induced by the undervaluation of the North euro in relation to the South euro (e N > 0), but also by the overvaluation of the South euro in relation to the dollar (1 + e S ) αN S . As previously, the equivalent transfer associated to an undervalued North euro can be computed in % of GDP (T N < 0) with:
• a negative transfer from the North to the South equal to . In the case of the relations between the Eurozone and the rest of the world, the euro is close to its equilibrium parity. It means that the two previous transfers balance each other. It looks as if the South was making a transfer to the rest of the world, which was after repaid to the North by the rest of the world. On the whole, due to the intra-European exchange rate misalignments, the South gives to the North directly . The result is the same as in the previous bilateral case, which is by this way generalized.
Empirical evaluation of the implicit transfers between Southern and Northern Europe
For a misalignment of 10 %, the flow of income received by Northern euro area countries (Germany, Finland, Austria and Netherlands) ranged between 3.8% and 9.4% (see table 10) 4 . We observe similar values for Southern euro area countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece), the flow of income paid by these countries ranged between 2.5% and 14.2%. In spite of relatively low openness ratio, Greece experienced an important overvaluation related notably to an increase of its relative ULC. We compute the implicit transfers by summing on the one hand, overvalued countries (Southern countries) and on the other hand, undervalued countries (Northern countries). Since the introduction of the Euro, the implicit transfers within the euro area have been favorable to Northern countries (see figure 3 ). Between 2000 and 2004, Southern countries was overvalued and transferred to the rest of the world around 2% of their GDP each year. Received income by Northern countries amounted to 6% GDP on average over the same period. Since 2005, we observe a sharp increase of Southern countries' overvaluation which reached 25% in 2008. This inappropriate level of the euro have had a strong impact on foreign trade since the equivalent transfer amounted to 9% of GDP in the minimal case and 14% of GDP in the maximal case. During this period, we observe an inverse situation in the North: the flow of income extracted from the undervaluation increases to reach an amount ranged between 7% and 10% of GDP in 2008. Since the opening of the crisis in 2008 a reduction of these transfers has been observed, thanks to a decrease of the exchange rate misalignments, partly induced by strong ULC adjustments in Ireland, Spain and Greece. However Northern countries continued to receive important transfers (between 4% and 6% of GDP) whereas Southern countries paid transfers of a similar amount (figure 2). With the austerity plans implemented since 2010 in most of Southern countries, we observe a reduction of current deficit (excepted in Greece) through recession or at least strong slowdown. As a result, ERM and related transfers have been reduced. This situation of imbalances between Northern and Southern countries related to structural heterogeneity in terms of competitiveness increase the debt-to-GDP ratio of Southern countries without any implementation of stabilization mechanisms. Source: authors' calculations.
Transfers and fiscal insurance system
These implicit transfers due to exchange rates misalignments can be compared with the fiscal insurance system proposed during the 1990s by the European Commission itself to compensate the effects of asymmetric evolutions. To simplify, we retain the mechanism suggested by Italianer and Pisani-Ferry (1992) . In case of an increase of the rate of unemployment larger in one country than in the rest of the Union, this country would benefit of a transfer provided by the European budget. This transfer would be calculated according to the following rule:
with U i , rate of unemployment in % of the country i, U iU E , rate of unemployment of the rest of the EU. The estimations calculated for the 1980s, with transfers limited to a maximum of 2% of the GDP, gave an annual average cost for the European budget rather reduced (around 0.2% of GDP). The estimations have been updated for the period 1996-2011. They give rather close results: an average cost of 0.21% of GDP when the transfers are limited to 2% of GDP; 0.26% of GDP without this ceiling when the fiscal insurance is applied to the members of the euro area; 0.26% and 0.28% of GDP (with or without ceiling) when this mechanism is supposed to be enlarged to all the countries of the EU, including the United Kingdom. Table 11 gives the results for the EU 27 without ceiling 5 . The transfers are, on average, more important for the Southern European countries (Greece 0.75%, Portugal 0.71%, Spain 1.05%, Ireland 0.87%), except for France and Italy, and for the Baltic countries. Germany also benefits (0.27% on average, concentrated at the beginning of the 2000s). During some years transfers can reach a significant level around 4 to 5% of GDP, when there is no ceiling. Although proposed since long time, this fiscal insurance mechanism has never received very favorable attention for two main reasons. First, its opponents consider this kind of transfer encourages bad behavior, as, in case of higher unemployment, the rest of the EU will pay to limit the negative effects. This argument cannot be ignored, but is not essential. Second, this insurance mechanism could play permanently in favor of the same countries which suffer of poor performances on the long run. Indeed it would be a mechanism of permanent transfer and not an insurance mechanism. The argument is more important, but does not seem relevant according to the observed results. However this question is sensible in the context of the euro zone crisis where the Southern countries are structurally affected by the overvaluation of their national euro and by problems of competitiveness. In such a case, the cost can be high for the other countries of the euro area, especially if there is no ceiling to the mechanism. According to estimations of the previous table, transfers could have reached 3 to 5% of GDP in Greece, Spain and Ireland at the end of the 2000s. These results are of the same magnitude as those obtained before with the implicit transfers due to the overvaluation of the South national euro 6 . Indeed it could be logic that the countries of the rest of the euro area support such transfers in order to avoid the South European countries to be trapped in recession and zero growth during a long period. Overall, this would help to preserve growth in the whole zone and to solve the public debt problems. These transfers would be better suited than intra zone credits which are actually the only form of help used in the euro area, except the partial cancellation of the Greek debt. These credits give time and help to transfer problems in the future, but with a permanent debt burden. However such transfer mechanism raises the problem of its duration and of its efficiency. Past experiences, like the German reunification during the 1990s or the permanent transfers from the North to the South of Italy, show that, if these transfers are a net gain for the beneficiary regions, they are not sufficient to solve structural problems. These transfers must be completed by more active policies in the fields of innovation, infrastructures and industries. The effect of federal transfers will be examined now using a two countries SFC model of a monetary union to have an assessment of their macroeconomic impact and their stabilizing role. 
A SFC model of two countries in a Monetary Union with federal budget or Eurobonds
A SFC model with two countries in monetary union allows a consistent description of assets and liabilities and of all the associated real and financial flows. The monetary union is composed of two countries (N and S) with an asymmetry of size. The country N is five times larger than the country S. This configuration facilitates analyzing the adjustment mechanisms of the country S facing the rest of the monetary union. We introduce federal budget with federal social transfers, public federal expenditure and Eurobonds. This will allow studying the stabilising effect of fiscal insurance system, as it has been proposed previously. This model is inspired by Godley and Lavoie (2006, 2007) , Lavoie (2003) and Duwicquet and Mazier (2010) . Firms accumulate both real and financial capital. They can finance their investments by undistributed profit, banking credit, or equities. We introduce two commercial banks able to supplying credit and also, possibly, rationing credit. Households hold banking deposits, bonds, and equities. We keep a similar representation of the central bank and the two governments which issue bonds and treasury bills. Taxes on capital income (banks and firms profit, households capital income) finance federal budget. Lastly, the model has been calibrated to represent the structure of the European Monetary Union. Households Households exhibit traditional consumption behaviour with a wealth effect, taking into account of capital gains on equities and bonds held. We specify a constant ratio of wealth to disposable income in the long run. Households' portfolio choice follows the approach developed by Godley (1999) and Tobin (1969) , with an arbitrage between cash (H h ), bank deposits (BD), bonds (p b .B), equities (p e .E h ) and Eurobonds (BT E h ), depending on the relative rates of return of each asset: r b for the interest rate on bonds of each country; i d for the interest rate on bank deposits which is the same in the two countries; r ee for the rate of return on equities in each country and r e for the interest rate on Eurobonds. The cash demand follows a simple transaction demand of money. The demand for bank deposits is not written and determined as a residual, using the accounting equation of the households' balance sheet. Households pay the taxes at the national level (T ) and at the federal level (T E h ). In addition, households receive social transfers: ST are national social transfers and FT are federal transfers. 7 When there are two symbols (N and S), the subscript denotes the country where the asset is held, the superscript the country where the asset is issued. For example, BT S N represents the bills held by country N and issued by the country S. 
Households' equations for country N Consumption

FT = T E
The allocation of transfers between North and South is made according to GDP differences. and negatively on the debt structure
and the cost of credit (r l ), with a possible positive demand effect. Their financial accumulation, i.e. firms' demand for equities (p e .E e ), is mainly related to the rate of return on equities held (r e ) with an arbitrage between domestic and foreign assets and a positive effect of the rate of profit reflecting the global environment. Firms can finance their investments through undistributed profit (U P ), bank credit, or by issuing equities. New equities issued by firms (p e .∆E) are determined as a percentage of the total real and financial investment, with positive effects of both credit cost and the debt ratio whose respective increases lead firms to issue more equities. The rate of return on equities r e is determined by dividends and capital gains. Lastly, income distribution is analyzed in a simple way with a constant share of wages. Undistributed profit is determined by a constant rate of saving by firms (s f ). Distributed dividends between shareholders (households and firms of both countries) are related to the held equities structure. (E −1 .∆p e = capital gains, DIV = distributed dividends) Firms' balance sheet 
Firms' equations for country N Fixed investment
I dN K N −1 = k0 N + k1.r f N −1 + k2. ∆Y N Y N −1 − k3. L N K N −1 − k4.r l (I d = desired investment, K = fixed capital stock, Y = GDP; r f = rate of profit = U P K −1 , U P = undistributed profit, L = loans, r l = interest= f 0 + f 1.r S e −f 2.rK N + p N e .E N eN + p S e .E S eN = L N + p N e .E N + V N Wages W N = ρ.Y N (W = wages) Distributed dividends DIV N = 1 − s f . Y N −1 − W N −1 − r l .L N −2
Distribution of dividends
Banks Firms can get from banks all the credits demanded without restriction; credit demand is determined by the balance of the firms' flow of funds. Investment is equal to the desired investment. The share between domestic and foreign banks' loans is simply related to the degree of openness of the economy. Reserve requirements in high powered money represent a fixed share of bank deposits and do not provide interest payments. A highly simplified treatment of interest rates is retained. The interest rate on loans (r l ) is presumed equal to the key interest rate of the central bank (i b ) plus a constant mark-up. To realize profits, banks apply a spread between the key rate and the rate on deposits (i d ). The central bank provides advances (RF) to commercial banks to allow the latter to provide the cash that households are asking for. These advances are made at a rate of interest (i b ) which is the key instrument of the monetary policy. They are determined as banks' balance. The central bank pays taxes, equal to its profit, which are shared between the two national governments in relation with each country's size. 
Country N banks' equations Credit
On the whole we have:
(Total net wealth at the level of the whole monetary union is equal to the total fixed capital; this equation is derived from others) Federal government Federal taxes But the central bank pays taxes. In case of a deficit incurred by country N , the current balance is financed through three channels: the holding of more assets of country N (bonds, treasury bills, equities) by country S than the opposite (holding of assets of country S by country N ); the channel of credit by banks of country S to firms of country N ; the refinancing by the central bank which plays a key role as lender of last resort.
Current account equations Foreign trade
Goods and services equilibrium
On the whole, the model has 107 equations for 107 endogenous variables. G N , G S (public expenditures) and i b (key interest rate fixed by the central bank) are exogenous. Calibration The model can be calibrated using balance sheets and national accounts in flows from Eurostat for the European countries. Two sets of calibration have been used, the first one with an important share of equities (350% of GDP as in France in 2010) which reflects a high degree of financialization. Dividends are larger than interest. The second calibration retains a smaller share of equities (172% of GDP) and a greater role played by credit. The capital-income ratio is also smaller ( K Y = 2 instead of 4), and equities are more held by firms than by households. Lastly, the share of foreign dividends in the total dividends received is kept constant instead of being determined by the structure of equities held. This assumption is more in line with the relative weakness of the capital income received from abroad. Our second calibration can be regarded as more realistic. However, the results of the two calibrations are rather close. The elasticities in the equations are close to usual estimations. The basic scenarios follow a rate of growth of GDP of 2% and a gross rate of accumulation of 7%.
Adjustments inside the monetary union
After the presentation of the model's main characteristics, adjustment mechanisms facing supply or demand shocks can be analyzed. It allows a measure of stabilization coefficients, especially for federal budget and Eurobonds. Results are given with a simplified version of the model where growth rates of equity prices are exogenous. We present the model in five successive versions in order to identify the stabilization effects specific to each factor:
• Model 1 contains neither federal budget nor Eurobonds;
• Model 2 includes a federal budget of approximately 3% of Eurozone's GDP. This model is divided into three sub-models depending on the parameter β of the following equation:
. In this case, adjustment is done simply by fiscal transfers. If the small country (country S) is affected by a negative shock to its production, it will pay less taxes and the rest of Euro zone (Country N) will pay more taxes;
-In model 2-b, β=50. The adjustment of the shock happens here by transfers from country N to country S in addition to fiscal transfers;
-In model 2-c, β=110. The extent of federal transfers is very high.
• Model 3 is without federal budget but with Eurobonds to finance projects of European investment. Goods and services equilibrium is:
European investments are entirely financed in this version by banks that are refinanced with the central bank.
Simulations: loss of country S competitiveness due to exchange rate misalignments We compare models 2 and 3 with model 1 (model without federal budget and Eurobonds).
In the foreign trade equations, we introduce an exogenous effect of higher unit labor costs in southern countries relative to the North. The term T I is set at 0 in the baseline. For illustrate the loss of country S competitiveness, the term T I is equal to 10 between periods 10 and 50.
This shock deteriorates the current account of country S and improves North's external trade. Consequently, we observe a decline of the GDP in the South and an increase in the North. We compare the effects of shock in the three model variants. The chart describes the relative change in GDP of southern countries (cf. figure 4 and table 13). Stabilization coefficients can be calculated by measuring the gap between financial autarky and the other models. For the model 1, the relative decline of the GDP after the shock (at period 10) can be written at period 10: −4.71% = 32.5% Logically, the stabilization coefficient depends positively on the amount of federal transfers. In model 2-a, stabilization is small in short term (2.9% in t=3). After the shock, country S pay less taxes and country N pay more taxes. In model 2-b, stabilization is higher than model 2-a. After the shock, Southern countries receive transfers financed by the federal budget who represent 3% of Euro zone GDP. This amount is divided between the two countries according to their different production change. The relative decline in GDP of the country S induces transfers from the North. Each year in average, the country N transfers almost 0.4% of its GDP. In terms of country S GDP, transfers represent almost 2% of GDP. This redistribution can stabilize around 40% of the shock in short term and 52% in long term. In model 2-c, transfers from North to South represent in average 0.6% of country N GDP and 3% of country S GDP. Stabilization effects are more important: 51% in t=0 and 69% in t=40. In model 3, European investments are financed by Eurobonds. Investment in percent of GDP represent in annual average 0.9% in two countries of Euro zone.
To counter the loss of competitiveness of South, large European projects are implemented. This 'growth shock' is mutually beneficial and the fasted growing can help southern countries. But it is well known that such European investment projects are complex to implement, which can reduce their macroeconomic impact. The establishment of a federal budget also has the advantage of limiting the rise in public debt of southern countries. The figure 5 highlights the evolution of public debt in model 1 (without federal budget) and model 2-b (with federal bud-get but without Eurobonds). In the baseline, the public debt will tend to increase. In t=50, public debt is around 80% in percent of GDP in South and 110% in North. In the scenario (South's overvaluation between periods 10 and 50), the public debt of Southern countries increases further due to the loss of competitiveness which leads to a reduction of GDP growth. But with a redistribution mechanism, GDP are less affected and the public debt increases less. Without federal budget, the South public debt increased by 90 points of GDP over forty years. Whereas its relative increase is 50 points with federal budget.
Conclusion
The euro zone crisis illustrates the insufficiency of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union characterized by a large heterogeneity. Exchange rate adjustments being impossible, they are very few alternative mechanisms. Relative wage and price flexibility are proposed in order to take place, at least partially. Actually these mechanisms are combined with fiscal restrictive policy to reduce current and public imbalances. They allow only a very slow and partial return to equilibrium with an important cost in terms of growth and employment and with large differences between countries, due to strong structural specificities. They are more inefficient when they are implemented simultaneously in interdependent countries, as it is presently the case in the euro zone, especially in the Southern European countries. This situation reflects a simple diagnosis. At the level of the whole euro zone current account is close to equilibrium and fiscal deficit is smaller than in many other OECD countries. The euro is close to its equilibrium parity. But intra-European imbalances are huge. The euro is strongly overvalued for Southern European countries, France included, and largely undervalued for Northern European countries, especially Germany. We gave new estimation of these misalignments. Using panel econometric techniques over the period 1994-2010, we confirmed that the exchange rate misalignments in the euro zone have diverged, reflecting unsustainable evolutions. These exchange rate misalignments block growth and induce fiscal and current deficits in the South while growth is boosted in the North by exports, especially towards the rest of the euro zone, and deficits are reduced. This situation is equivalent to implicit positive transfers in favour on the North and negative transfers at the detriment of the South, which are largely ignored in the public debate. We gave estimation of these implicit transfers and compared these results with the evaluation of the system of fiscal insurance proposed by the Commission to fight asymmetric evolutions. In a second step, we used a stock-flow consistent model of a monetary union with two countries along the lines of Godley and Lavoie (2007) . The model describes the real sector and assets and liabilities of all the agents in order to analyze adjustment mechanisms and financial integration in a consistent manner. A federal budget is introduced with federal expenditures and social transfers financed by federal taxes and euro-bonds issuing. Three results were obtained. The stabilizing role of such a federal budget is confirmed facing asymmetric shock, especially a loss of competitiveness due to exchange rate misalignments inside the monetary union. Similarly, the stabilizing role of euro-bonds used to finance European investment projects is illustrated. Their role in the pooling of national debts would be the last point to examine.
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